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Civil Rights and Human Rights: A Call for
Closer Collaboration
By Douglass Cassel
[Editor's note: This article is adapted from
the author's remarks on July 19, 2000,
before the annual meeting of the Chicago
Lauyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law Inc.]
If rights are to enjoy effective protection,
experience worldwide teaches that, more
than the laws on the books, what counts
is affordable access by victims to capa-
ble lawyers committed to enforcing their
rights. Human rights would be far more
secure if we could clone the Chicago
Lawyers' Committee in, say, ten strategi-
cally located cities around the globe.
Those of you who may be familiar
with my commentaries know that my
usual topics are mass murderers overseas
or U.S. foreign policy toward them.
Today, however, I would like to focus
on something closer to home-the his-
tory of and prospects for fruitful collab-
oration between the civil rights move-
ment and the international human rights
movement. My purpose is to encourage
dialogue between civil rights and human
rights lawyers. As a sometime civil rights
lawyer myself, I am convinced that such
a dialogue could be productive.
We might start by distinguishing
human rights from civil rights. In cus-
tomary American usage, the difference is
simple enough: human rights are for
other countries; civil rights are for us.
Jurisprudentially, of course, the dif-
ference is more profound. Civil rights are
granted to members of a society by its
laws. They can expand or contract with
congressional majorities. In contrast,
human rights do not derive from positive
law and are not limited to the members
of a polity. They are inherent in the
human person; we are all born with
them. Laws and governments can neither
grant nor take them away but can only
recognize them-or fail to do so. Civil
rights may vary with national laws, but
human rights are universal.
If that sounds like a theory of natur-
al rights, it is. Natural rights are contro-
versial. Who is to say what they are? On
what authority, by what methodology?
Personally I am not haunted by such
questions. My gut tells me that some
rights are so innate that no law can take
them away. Even if Hitler had decreed
the Final Solution through all the forms of
law, that would not have made it legal
in my book.
In practice, fortunately, we need not
be diverted by such theoretical debates.
Nowadays human rights are recognized
almost everywhere in positive law-
specifically in a dozen major global and
regional treaties developed in the last half
century and now ratified by most coun-
tries. Collectively they constitute the basic
content of contemporary international
human rights law.
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An
Human Rights
Broad international legal recognition
of human rights is surprisingly recent.
Almost none of it existed before my first
daughter was born 22 years ago. In law
school some 30 years ago, I studied civil
rights, but not human rights. Circa 1970
I thought human rights were more the
province of divinity schools than law
schools, and at the time I was right.
But even then, some people could
see a different day dawning. I have never
forgotten a job interview I had in 1972
with Jack Greenberg of the National
Association for the Advancement of
Colored People Legal Defense Fund. As
you may know, Greenberg had partici-
pated in practically every major U.S.
Supreme Court civil rights case since
Brown v. Board.1 I asked him, If he had
it to do all over again, would he do any-
thing different? "Yes," he answered to my
astonishment, "I'd go into international
human rights law."
By that time the international human
rights movement had already been dawn-
ing for about 30 years. At its beginning
Americans were in the forefront. One key
harbinger was a 1941 congressional ad-
dress, widely publicized around the
world, by Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
"We look forward," said Roosevelt, "to a
world founded upon four essential
human freedoms[:... freedom of speech
and expression... freedom of every per-
son to worship God in his own way...
freedom from want ... [and] freedom
from fear ......
Three years later, in his 1944 mes-
sage to Congress, Roosevelt expanded on
these thoughts. "True individual freedom,"
he declared, "cannot exist without eco-
nomic security and independence. 'Neces-
sitous men are not freemen.' People who
are hungry and out of a job are the stuff
of which dictatorships are made."
This was no casual philosophizing.
FDR's generation saw the economic
chaos of the Weimar Republic descend
into the political psychosis of the Third
Reich. In our own time the linkage
between economic and political rights is
evident again in countries from Ven-
ezuela to Algeria to Russia.
In his 1944 message FDR called for a
"Second Bill of Rights under which a new
basis of security and prosperity can be
established for all-regardless of station,
race or creed." He advocated, among oth-
ers, the right to a useful and remunerative
job; the right to earn enough to provide
adequate food and clothing and recre-
ation; the right of every family to a decent
home; the right to adequate medical care;
the right to adequate protection from the
economic fears of old age, sickness, acci-
dent, and unemployment; and the right to
a good education.
The following year, at the founding
conference of the United Nations in San
Francisco, calls were made for an inter-
national bill of rights, one that would enti-
tle all people everywhere both to the
kinds of rights in the original American
Bill of Rights and to those in Roosevelt's
Second Bill of Rights.
Among the leading agitators for
human rights in San Francisco were lead-
ers of groups like the NAACP, the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, the American
Jewish Committee, the National Catholic
Welfare Conference, and the American
Association of University Women, among
many others. For such groups-who
were or would become important mem-
bers of the incipient civil rights move-
ment-the unity of interest between inter-
national human rights and domestic civil
rights required no explanation.
They did not immediately succeed.
The U.N. Charter did not contain a bill
of rights. But it did commit the United
Nations to work for "human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion; .. . ." When one recalls that the
world of 1945 consisted largely of colo-
nialism and communism abroad, and Jim
Crow at home, this was a revolutionary
proposition.
In closing the San Francisco confer-
ence, President Harry Truman called for
building on this statement of principle by
adopting an international bill of rights as
one of the first orders of business of the
United Nations. It was not long in com-
ing. In 1946 Eleanor Roosevelt became
1 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the first chair of the newly established
U.N. Human Rights Commission. After
two years of drafting by her commission
and lengthy debate in the General
Assembly, the United Nations in 1948
adopted the world's first Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.2
The Universal Declaration would
have made FDR proud; it proclaims near-
ly every right both in the original
American Bill of Rights and in his Second
Bill of Rights. But it does not purport to
create them, merely to recognize them
as preexisting. The very first article of the
Universal Declaration proclaims, "All
human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights."
Nor does it proclaim a narrow or self-
ish vision of rights divorced from respon-
sibility. Article I continues: "They are
endowed with reason and conscience
and should act toward one another in a
spirit of brotherhood."
By 1948, however, American support
for international human rights was
already' in jeopardy. The American Bar
Association, for example, asked for a
delay in the adoption of the Universal
Declaration; the American Bar Association
president issued dire warnings of the
threats it allegedly posed to the sover-
eign rights of states. The State Depart-
ment instructed Mrs. Roosevelt to tell the
U.N. General Assembly that the United
States did not consider the Universal
Declaration to be legally binding but
merely an aspirational statement.
What happened to put on the brakes
in Washington?
One factor was race. After all 1948
was still six years before the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board.3 In
1947, under the leadership of Dr. W.E.B.
Dubois, the NAACP filed with the United
Nations a lengthy petition challenging
racial discrimination against the Negro
people of the United States as a violation
of the U.N. Charter. In Oyama v.
California in early 1948 four justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that
California land laws, discriminating
against persons of Japanese ancestry, vio-
lated not only the U.S. Constitution but
also the U.N. Charter, a treaty to which
the United States is a party, and which is
part of the supreme law of the land under
Article VI of the Constitution.4
The specter of U.N. interference with
American racial law and policy provoked
opposition not only by racists but also
among their allies who believed that such
matters were for Americans, not foreign-
ers, to decide. The historical strands of
isolationism in our polity were thus a sec-
ond source of American resistance to
international human rights. For "America
Firsters," the very concept of human
rights is, well, un-American.
A third source of opposition was the
cold war. The Soviet Union and its allies
were members of the United Nations.
Their delegates sat on the U.N. Human
Rights Commission.5 Their judges sat on
the United Nations' judicial organ, the
International Court of Justice, or World
Court.6 Might they not use these posts to
embarrass the United States by con-
demning our racial discrimination as vio-
lations of human rights?
All this led by the early 1950s to a pro-
posed constitutional amendment whose
lead sponsor was Ohio Senator John
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71
(1948).
3 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
4 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945; U.S. CONST.
art. VI: "[Aill treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary noth-
withstanding. "
5 The U.N. Human Rights Commission, may be reached at OHCHR-UNOG, 8-14 Avenue
de la Paix, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. Extensive information is available on the U.N.
High Commission for Human Rights' Web site, www.unhchr.ch.
6 International Court of Justice, Peace Palace, 2517 KJ, The Hague, Netherlands; see the
Court's Web site, www.icj-cij.org.
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2000
Human Rights
Bricker. The Bricker amendment would
have severely hampered American ability
to participate in treaties. 7 For example, it
would have turned the Supremacy Clause
upside down, so that states' rights under
the Tenth Amendment would have
trumped the federal government's author-
ity under treaties. In order to defeat it,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower had
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
promise the Senate not to worry-the
United States simply would not join any
international human rights treaties.
There matters rested for a quarter of
a century. American racial segregation
would be challenged successfully but
only as a violation of civil rights, not
human rights. The legal engines of racial
progress in America were to be reinter-
pretations of the Constitution and the pas-
sage of new civil rights laws, not appeals
to the United Nations or to treaties. Civil
rights laws and their constituency became
functionally disconnected from interna-
tional human rights.
By the time Jimmy Carter became the
"human rights president," issues of legal-
ized race discrimination in America had
diminished. But not even he could break
through the cold war ice. Carter signed
several human rights treaties but could
not get the Senate to consent to their rat-
ification. 8 Worse yet, in his failing effort
to secure Senate approval, he adopted
three approaches which were self-
destructive of American participation in
human rights treaties and which have
now set an unfortunate precedent.
First, he agreed to ratify human rights
treaties only to the extent that they were
consistent with preexisting American law.
Consider what would happen if every
country took such an approach. There
would be no international human rights
law, only a patchwork of different nation-
al versions.
Second, he ruled out effective inter-
national enforcement. America would rat-
ify treaties but would not accept individ-
ual complaint procedures before U.N.
human rights monitoring committees,
much less submit to the jurisdiction of
international courts in human rights cases.
And, third, Carter also ruled out
domestic enforcement by declaring that
the treaties were not "self-executing," that
is, they could not serve as the basis for a
cause of action in American courts.
With such constraints, asked the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in
New York, why bother? Imagine how we
would react if the Chinese or Fidel Castro
purported to ratify human rights treaties
subject to such restrictions. We would
not be deceived by their cynical gestures.
Now reflect on how the rest of the world
reacted when they learned of Carter's
proposals.
Yet Carter's proposals are now the
law of the land. Under Presidents Ronald
Reagan, George Bush, and Carter the
United States ratified four major human
rights treaties.9 Reagan first got the United
States to ratify the Convention Against
Genocide in 1988-only 40 years after it
had been adopted by the United Nations.
7 Sen. John Bricker actually introduced a series of similar proposed amendments over a
period of years. See generally Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition
to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker
Amendment, 10 HUM. RTs. Q. 309 (1988).
8 Pres. Jimmy Carter signed and sent to the Senate the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the
American Convention on Human Rights; and the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, Senate exhibits
C-F, 95th Congress, 2d Sess. (Feb. 23, 1978).
9 Convention Against Genocide in 1988, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force, Dec. 9, 1948; the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316(1966), 999 U.N.T.S 171, entered into
force, March 23, 1976; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51(1984), entered into force, June 26 1987; and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969.
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Next came Bush in 1992 with the single
most comprehensive treaty, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.10 But Bush saddled U.S. ratifica-
tion of the Covenant with Carter's three
hobbling restrictions.
In 1994 the Clinton administration
secured ratification of U.N. treaties against
torture and against race discrimination. 11
But still the United States was held back
by the legacy of American hostility to
international human rights standards
One can understand and even share the con-
cerns ofJustice and State Department officials
over the political impact of an adverse interna-
tional court ruling on a sensitive domestic politi-
cal issue. But Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
and Argentina, to name only a few, have all
accepted international jurisdiction and survived
adverse rulings in sensitive cases. What makes
the United States so special?
(except for other countries) and by the
wedge driven between the civil rights and
human rights movements.
One example of this emerged in a
1993 meeting between officials of the
Justice and State Departments. Presiding
was the new chief of the Civil Rights
Division of the Justice Department-a
highly respected civil rights lawyer. The
administration was prepared to ratify the
International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion.12 The issue was whether we would
accept the treaty's dispute resolution pro-
vision, by which disputes between State
parties regarding the interpretation or
application of the treaty could be referred
to the International Court of Justice.
There was some reason to hope that
the United States might at long last sub-
mit to the international rule of law in
human rights cases, as nearly all other
democracies in the world had already
done. The cold war was over; no longer
were communist countries represented
on the World Court. Racial discrimination
was now illegal in the United States, too.
But, after extended debate, the group
decided to reject World Court jurisdiction
over U.S. race discrimination. The group
was worried about racial disparities in
the imposition of the death penalty. The
Supreme Court had declined to find dis-
parate impact, without proof of discrim-
inatory intent, to be unconstitutional. But
how might the World Court interpret the
treaty?
One can understand and even share
their concerns over the political impact
of an adverse international court ruling
on a sensitive domestic political issue.
But Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and
Argentina, to name only a few, have all
accepted international jurisdiction and
survived adverse rulings in sensitive
cases. What makes the United States so
special?
Moreover, what message does the
American boycott send to the rest of the
world? Does it not provide cover for
Peru's Alberto Fujimori and Zimbabwe's
Robert Mugabe and other authoritarian
rulers who are delighted to cite the home
of the free as precedent for not submit-
ting to international human rights law?13
That 1993 meeting came during
Clinton's first term, the high point of U.S.
rapprochement with human rights
treaties. In 1994 the Senate went Repub-
lican, and Jesse Helms became chair of
the Foreign Relations Committee. Since
then the Convention on Discrimination
Against Women has been frozen in com-
mittee. We remain one of only two coun-
tries on the planet that have not joined
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child. The other is Somalia, which has
no government.
From the point of view of American
civil rights, one might ask whether this
10 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 9.
Id.
12 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 9.
13 As of this writing, Alberto Fujimori is president of Peru and Robert Mugabe is president
of Zimbabwe.
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matters. After all, domestic American law
is more protective of rights than interna-
tional law, is it not?
Not always. For example, interna-
tional law places greater restrictions on
the death penalty. Unlike the U.S.
Supreme Court, international law pro-
hibits capital punishment for those aged
16 or 17 at the time of the crime. It
arguably requires higher standards of
death penalty defense counsel and is less
prone to waive rights based on proce-
dural default. In some circumstances
international law prohibits the more
extreme and prolonged forms of the
"death row phenomenon." It may well
prohibit extreme racial disparities in the
imposition of the death penalty, even
without proof of discriminatory intent.
International law may also be more
protective of prisoners' rights than is
American law. Whereas we prohibit only
punishment that is cruel and unusual, and
some Supreme Court jurisprudence sug-
gests that these requirements may be con-
junctive, international law prohibits pun-
ishments or treatment that are cruel,
inhuman, or degrading. Sexual harass-
ment of prisoners that does not cause
serious physical injury, for example, may
not always violate American rights, but it
violates international rights. Invasions of
prisoner privacy-for example, male
guards observing female prisoners show-
er-may not violate American law, but it
violates international law.
Gay rights are another example. The
Burger Court ruled in Bowers v. Hardwick
that state sodomy laws, criminalizing pri-
vate, consenting relations between adults,
are constitutional.14 Recently a Louisiana
court reached a similar result.15 By con-
trast, at almost the same time as Bowers,
the European Court of Human Rights
ruled that such laws violated the human
right to privacy. 16 The U.N. Human Rights
Committee has since found them to be
discriminatory as well.17
Juvenile rights are a further example.
International law requires that juvenile
offenders be segregated from adults and
be accorded treatment appropriate to
their age and legal status. 18 Is that stan-
dard presently met in Cook County?
I could go on with further examples,
but one might ask, so what? If the United
States declares human rights treaties to
be non-self-executing, are they not unen-
forceable in our courts?
Not necessarily. There may be a vari-
ety of ways to get mileage from human
rights treaties even if they do not directly
provide a cause of action. Statutes may be
adopted to implement them. One may
argue that they are "laws" for purposes of
section 1983 civil rights suits or the gen-
eral federal jurisdictional statute. They may
be used to assist in interpretation of U.S.
law. Since the Supreme Court's decision in
The Charming Betsy in 1804, U.S. jurispru-
dence has provided that whenever a law
of the United States can be interpreted in
a manner consistent with the law of
nations, it must be so interpreted. 19
International human rights law can
also be used in the advocacy of public
policy and in legislative drafting. It can be
incorporated in administrative regulations
as, for example, some U.S. prison sys-
tems incorporate the U.N. minimum
prison standards.
The opportunities are there. Pursuing
them will be no easier, and no more like-
ly to yield immediate victories, than was
the civil rights litigation strategy devised
long ago by Thurgood Marshall. But, in
the long run, reconciling civil rights with
human rights may not only strengthen
rights protection here at home but also
enable this democracy to play a more
credible and constructive role in protect-
ing rights in other countries.
14 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
15 Louisiana v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. Sup. Ct. 2000).
16 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), 4 E.H.H. R. 149 (1981).
17 Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Human Rights Comm'n 1994).
18 E.g., articles 10.2(b) and 10.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 9.
19 The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 34, 67, 2 L. Ed. 208 (1804) (opinion for the Court
by Chief Justice Marshall).
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